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History has to be rewritten because history is the selection of those
threads of causes or antecedents that we are interested in.1
Introduction
When the U.S. Supreme Court began to write about the historical
roots of religious freedom, it was inevitable that scholarly attention
would be captured. History is a grand subject in which we all have a
very real stake. "[T]hat which, in the opinions of the Supreme Court, is
believed to be true about the past"2 actually lives in the present-it forms
a narrative that shapes doctrine, determines outcomes, and affects lives.
Today the Court continues to write about history, and academics
continue to comment on the Court's use of history to interpret the
Establishment Clause.3  What more can be said about a subject that has
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quoted in Ferenc M. Szasz, The Many Meanings of
History, Part I, in THE HISTORY TEACHER 552, 557 (1974).
2. CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 20 (1969)
(defining the history produced by the U.S. Supreme Court) ("[T]hat which, in the
opinions of the Supreme Court, is believed to be true about the past-about past facts and
past thoughts.").
3. In January of 2006, the Association of American Law Schools Section on Law
and Religion assembled an impressive panel of scholars to comment on history in the
Court's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise jurisprudence. Podcast of Panel
Program: "The (Re)Turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship" (Jan. 6,
2006), http://www3.cali.org/aalsO6/mp3/AALS%202006%20Delaware%20A%2020060
106%2OThe%20Retum%20to%2OHistory%20in%2OReligion%20Clause.mp3. A
majority of the panelists published articles in a symposium issue of the Notre Dame Law
Review. 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1697-1894 (2006). Only one of the articles addresses
the Court's use of Establishment Clause history. See Steven K. Green, "Bad History ":
The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717
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produced countless books, law journal articles, and scholarly
commentary by legal academics, historians, political scientists, and
Supreme Court Justices, no less? 4 Yet there is the unfinished business of
crafting a solution to the problem of the Court's use of history, a theme
that has been conspicuously absent from much of the discussion on the
subject.
First, the problem. The landmark Supreme Court decision
incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states-Everson v.
Board of Education-interpreted the Clause based on its history.5
Though Everson purported to apply an original understanding of the
Establishment Clause, it is most often rejected as "law office history" by
originalists, Justices who otherwise support a historical method of
interpretation.6 On the other hand, living Constitutionalists, the Justices
most likely to support Everson, are the ones who, though quite
comfortable with history, recoil from a strict application of a presumed
original understanding to decide cases.7 This jarring lack of consensus
on the Court concerning how to use history in Establishment Clause
cases-in the face of apparent agreement that the history should play
some role-has prevented the Justices from seriously evaluating each
other's historical claims. Instead, what one finds in the opinions are
simply different versions of the same purported history, none of which
speak directly to each other aside from predictable retorts about the
(2006). Other recent works have also addressed the Supreme Court's use of history. See
generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); LEONARD W.
LEVY, RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (2d ed. Univ.
N.C. Press 1994) (1986); Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause
Answers That History Doesn't Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1617; Mark David Hall,
Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court's Use of History in
Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563 (2006); John C. Jeffries & James R. Ryan, A
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001); David
Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause
Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94 (2002); John E. Joiner, Note, A Page of History or a
Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 507 (1996).
4. Such luminaries have addressed the larger question of whether the Court should
use history in constitutional decision-making. See generally, infra notes 10 and 11.
5. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. I have chosen the terms "originalist" and "living Constitutionalist" to describe,
respectively, the views of those who advocate a jurisprudence of original intention or
original meaning and those who do not. Although these are less than perfect terms, the
basic disagreement should be familiar to most readers.
7. In his extensive survey of the Court's Religion Clause cases, Mark Hall found
liberal justices, i.e., justices who have voted against the state in favor of individuals or
groups-a description that correlates with the living Constitutionalists described in this
article-actually used history slightly more than conservative justices. See Hall, supra
note 3, at 577. He found that liberal justices, unlike conservatives, tended to cite to
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison more than other framers and founders or the
historical context combined. See id. at 580.
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beliefs of Thomas Jefferson or James Madison. A striking feature of this
history, particularly to the non-historian, is its incredible flexibility.
Justices and Courts over time have drawn dramatically different
conclusions from the same basic pool of facts.
The many legal scholars, historians and academics familiar with this
problem have developed a narrow range of proposals: avoid the use of
history to decide Religion Clause cases, 8 improve the quality of the
history presented,9 lower the standards for evaluating the history found in
judicial opinions, 0 and develop a usable historical narrative to achieve
desirable political and social goals. 1 Because scholars, like the Court,
are divided on the appropriate use of history in Establishment Clause
cases, their proposals tend to embed their general views on the use of
history. Hence, the proposals are of little practical value, not necessarily
because they lack merit, but because a judge or Justice must be inclined
to treat history in the same way as the scholar who offers the proposal.
In a perfect world, a viable proposal to address the Court's use of history
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence would transcend this ideological
barrier. A proposal that avoids the basic fight over how to use history,
however, also should have enough substance to be useful.
In this article, I offer a procedural solution to the problem of the
Court's use of Establishment Clause history: I propose that the Court
separate its discussion of history from the Court's holding in the case. At
first blush it may seem that the Court already engages in this practice,
and that my proposal therefore has failed the usefulness criterion. It is
true that in the typical history-based Establishment Clause opinion the
Court frames the legal issue, then it sets out a review of historical
material, followed by its legal analysis, which includes some application
of the history to the facts in the case. But even with a format that already
includes a separate discussion of history, the significance of the history
to the decision is often obscured by the rhetoric surrounding the
historical presentation. An originalist historical analysis often
presupposes the existence of connections between past and present that
are far from obvious. A living Constitutionalist historical account
assumes, without attempting to prove, that the history actually points to
the supposed larger premises that drive the decision. Currently, the fact
8. E.g., Green, supra note 3, at 1753; Gey, supra note 3, at 1624-31; Reiss, supra
note 3, at 174.
9. See Hall, supra note 3, at 604-09 (providing suggestions to improve the quality
of the Court's history).
10. See generally John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 193
(1993) (not limiting discussion to Establishment Clause cases).
11. See generally Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History
in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 87 (1997) (not limiting discussion to
Establishment Clause cases).
[Vol. 112:3
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that the history is provided up front does little to elucidate the
significance of the history to the decision, or to reconcile the competing
historical interpretations found in the various opinions in the case.
By contrast, the type of bifurcation proposed here involves a
separation that goes further than the ordinary break between history and
analysis found in the Court's opinions. What I propose is a complete
separation between the Court's treatment of history and its holding in a
particular case. The "history" section would contain the facts and details
surrounding historical events. In this section, the opinion writer would
be required to explain the choice of materials, their significance, and any
additional information that would be helpful. The history section would
also contain, where appropriate, a mention of alternative interpretations
of certain historical facts and events. The "law" section would follow
with an explanation of how the history is relevant to the decision in the
case. This explanation is perhaps the most promising feature of the
procedural framework because it requires the authoring justice to detail
and justify the use of history. Currently, Justices providing
Establishment Clause history approach their task as if the history itself
commands a particular result. Instead, this conspicuous acknowledgment
of the opinion writer as middle man would remove some of the
persuasive force of "mythistory,"1 2 inviting the reader to think soberly
about whether the history points to the decision in the case, or to any
particular decision at all. In other words, I propose a type of
transparency that would untie the Establishment Clause history and
doctrine so that we may critically evaluate their relationship to each
other.
At this point the reader may question whether this proposal truly
avoids the ideological battle between the originalists and the living
Constitutionalists. In other words, the reader may assume that my
proposal also embeds my views concerning the wisdom of using history
to decide Establishment Clause cases. Because the proposal assumes
that history will be used in future cases, it does reflect my general
disagreement with scholars who counsel a wholesale retreat from
Establishment Clause history.' 3 Instead of retreating from the use of
history, it seems preferable that the Court should endeavor to clarify its
12. See Paul Horwitz, Book Review, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis-and
the Crisis of History-in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459, 507-08 (1997)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)) ("[W]e
cannot choose between the competing visions of our past treatment of religious liberty
and establishment offered by cases such as Everson v. Board of Education and Wallace v.
Jaffree purely through historical research. We must also ask ourselves which narrative
rings the most true for us, as we go about constructing our own narrative about religious
freedom.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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use of history. Both originalists and living Constitutionalists should
welcome the clarifications suggested in this proposal because each camp
has accused the other of hijacking history.14 Beyond mutual suspicion,
however, there is a further reason for originalists as well as living
Constitutionalists to seriously entertain a proposal designed to improve
the Court's use of history: for better or for worse, the modem
Establishment Clause was born in history and has been justified by
history throughout its existence. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court will completely abandon the use of history in this
area. 15
Part I of this article briefly contextualizes and describes the Court's
use of history in Establishment Clause doctrine. Specifically, the first
major obstacle to any unified approach is the significant disagreement
over the appropriate role for history, a debate that is outlined in Part I
and explored further in Part II. Likewise, Part II offers some insight
from the discipline of history, including criteria for evaluating and
explaining the use of history in opinion writing. Part III of this article
defends the procedural proposal and ultimately offers a sample re-writing
of the Everson opinion using the framework proposed in this article.
I. A Brief Review of History's Ascendancy in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
A. A Contextual Review
Justice Rutledge, in his dissent in Everson, made the now oft-quoted
assertion that "[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to
or given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the
First Amendment." 16 As he put it, the Religion Clause is "at once the
refined product and the terse summation of that history." 7  But the
Court's use of history in the context of the Religion Clause(s), and more
specifically the Establishment Clause, is more clearly understood in light
14. The promise of transparency in this context calls to mind a quote attributed to
Justice Brandeis: "Sunshine is the best disinfectant." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
15. E.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). In
the recent taxpayer standing decision from the Court's 2006-2007 term, though the
plurality avoided discussion of the history that grounded the applicable precedent, neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Souter could resist mentioning it. See id. at 2576, 2581-83
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2585, 2588 (Souter, J., dissenting). As new legal
issues arise for which there is no directly applicable Establishment Clause precedent,
resort to some other ground for decision, such as history, should be expected.
16. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
[Vol. 112:3
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of the Courts use of history in constitutional cases, particularly in the
second half of the twentieth century.'
8
Though the Supreme Court's use of history can be traced back to its
earliest decisions, the opinions of the Supreme Court during the Warren
Court era came under heavy fire for their asserted misuse of history.
Historian Alfred Kelley in his 1965 article, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, issued a stinging contemporary criticism that accused the
Court of employing the historical essay as a means of avoiding
undesirable precedent in an effort to reach a particular result.' 9 Kelley
charged that the Court's opinions were full of "law office history, 20 that
paved the way for "extensive judicial intervention in contemporary
political problems.' Kelley's critique of the Court's Establishment
Clause history plainly rejected the fruit of Everson:
22
The present-day debate over the aboriginal meaning of the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment
illustrates very clearly the many dangers involved in attempting to
recover a clear and precise judgment on the part of the authors of a
text almost two hundred years old, and expecting it to throw a
decisive, revelatory light upon twentieth-century problems of church
and state. The eighteenth-century proponents of the First
Amendment did not do us the favor of conducting their discussion in
terms of released time, school religious exercises, bus transportation,
Sunday closings, and so on. They were concerned with the problems
of their day and not with those of ours, and to assume that a
revelatory reconstruction is possible is to fall into an amateurish
historical solecism. Pragmatically speaking, the religion clauses in
the Constitution cannot be construed today merely in terms of their
18. The topic of whether the Court has used history properly has become something
of a "dead horse," and I only briefly summarize those arguments in this article, though
some rehashing is unavoidable. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The
United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 227
(1988) ("For the past half-century, historians, judges and lawyers have bemoaned the
ways that the Court has misunderstood, misapplied, or otherwise abused the past on its
way to formulating doctrines for the present."); see also Reid, supra note 10, at 198-99.
Reid observes: "[t]here are no other decisions dealing with American constitutional law
that owe more to violations of the canons of historical interpretation than those dealing
with the establishment and free exercise of religion." Id. at 220.
19. See generally Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S.
CT. REV. 119.
20. See id. at 122. Kelley defined law office history as "the selection of data
favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory
data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered." Id. at 122, n. 13.
21. Seeid. at 125.
22. Kelley echoed criticism found in a review article by Mark DeWolfe Howe, a
critic of the Court's history in Everson and later cases following in Everson's path. Id. at
119. See generally MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
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aboriginal meaning. The failure to understand this elementary fact
constitutes one of the major weaknesses of the history-oriented
opinions of the Court in the last few years.
23
Criticisms such as Kelley's were followed by a wave of renewed
interest in and attention to history in legal and constitutional scholarship.
Much of the robust historical scholarship that ensued, or the "turn to
history" as it is sometimes called, proceeded from the same basic
premises but launched in different directions. In one direction was the
search for the original intent of the Framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights-the method of constitutional
interpretation that became known as "originalism. ' '24 Originalism found
its supporters on the Court while witnessing the intellectual development
of its chief rival, living Constitutionalism.
25
Viewed through today's lens, the Court's use of history in the
context of the Establishment Clause highlights the "Great Divide"
26
between these two distinct and familiar schools of constitutional
interpretation-the modern version of originalism and a historically
informed living Constitutionalism. Originalism is currently understood as
an interpretive method that relies on the original meaning of the framers
and ratifiers of the Constitution.27 By contrast, living Constitutionalism
is an interpretive method that is governed by contemporary concerns as
23. Kelley, supra note 19, at 141-42.
24. Moving in another direction but only tangentially related to the subject of this
article was a genre of legal scholarship known as "civic republicanism." For a lengthy
discussion of this development, see generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996), and the treatment of her work in two articles: Neil M.
Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History,
13 J.L. & POL. 809, 823-30 (1997), and Horwitz, supra note 12, at 459-510.
25. It is worth noting that originalism has earned its share of criticism for its
treatment of history. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Constitutional Origins of Judicial
Review: When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 407 (2003). See
generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (criticizing prominent originalists but focusing on the work
of civic republicans); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659
(1987) (criticizing originalist assumptions and methodology). Civic republicans,
mentioned earlier, also took some heat. See Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal
Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 909, 926-28 (1996).
Mark Tushnet concludes that history generated by lawyers does not pretend to be history
at all. Id. at 932. See also Flaherty, supra.
26. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 38 (1997).
27. This definition stresses an inquiry into the original meaning of the language of
the Constitution as contrasted with the original intent of the Framers, which is how
originalism was first understood by critics and conceived by its proponents. Compare,
e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (original intent) with SCALIA,
supra note 26 (original meaning).
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well as precedent.28  Though the living Constitutionalist may be
influenced by the Constitution's original meaning, she is rarely bound by
it. In the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the originalist and
living Constitutionalist approaches feature two very different paths for
the use of history-one that would reject Everson and another that would
hold it firm.29 In the Part that follows, I briefly outline the emergence of
these two approaches to history as reflected in a sampling of some of the
Court's major Establishment Clause cases, witnessing the development
of the problem with an eye toward crafting a solution.3 °
B. Doctrinal Review
1. Old-School Law Office History
The Court's use of history in Establishment Clause cases can be
traced to a free exercise case involving early Mormon bigamy
prosecutions in the Territory of Utah. In Reynolds v. United States,31 the
Court considered Reynolds' claim that his indictment violated the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because the criminal prohibition
against bigamy conflicted with his Mormon beliefs. 32  To divine the
meaning and scope of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court turned to "the
history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. 33
The Court began with a general description of the purported
excesses of religious establishments in "some of the colonies and
States, ' 34 asserting that states had taxed citizens to support religion
against their will, that states had punished citizens for not attending
public worship, and that states had also punished citizens for
"entertaining heretical opinions. 35  Moving from the general to the
28. See infra Part II.A.2.
29. As will be seen, these two approaches to history dominate the discussion in this
article, though there are other categories of "history" that the Court has used in
Establishment Clause cases. This article does not explore separately, for example, the
Court's treatment of the historical genesis of certain practices, otherwise known as
tradition. Nor does this article evaluate the Court's discussion of the cultural history of
certain controversies, though cultural history also has played a role in some of the Court's
Establishment Clause opinions.
30. Although I only survey a handful of cases here, some of the descriptions provide
more detail than may be required for those familiar with this area. Scholars in other areas
and students, however, should find the descriptions helpful.
31. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 162 ("The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must go
elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think,
than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted.").
34. Id. at 162.
35. Id. at 162-63.
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specific, the Court identified the Virginia experience as particularly
revelatory.36 The Court described the sequence of events known as the
Virginia Assessment Controversy-the proposed "bill establishing
provision for teachers of the Christian religion," James Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance against the bill, and Thomas Jefferson's
alternative and successful bill "for establishing religious freedom."
37
Based on language from Jefferson's preamble to the bill, the Court laid
out the boundaries of its free exercise doctrine, claiming to have
ascertained "the true distinction between what properly belongs to the
church and what to the State."
38
Turning to the Constitutional convention, the Court again looked to
Jefferson as an authority and cited from a personal letter Jefferson wrote
that expressed disappointment at the absence of a specific provision in
the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion.39 Following logically
in the Court's sequence of events was Madison's proposal of the
"amendment now under consideration" to the first Congress, in which
the Court concluded simply that it "met the views of the advocates of
religious freedom, and was adopted., 40 Thomas Jefferson, "afterwards,"
the Court continued, penned his now famous letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association from which the Court quoted, crowning Jefferson as
the authoritative voice on the scope of the Religion Clause(s). 41 Based
on the language of the preamble and Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptists, the Court held that Congress could exercise legislative power
over actions such as bigamy so long is it did not regulate opinions.42
It is unfortunate that Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds
launched the Court's religion clause doctrine with such patent use of law
office history. In less than 350 words, the Supreme Court covered much
historical ground, creating a seemingly coherent flow of events that lead
to its conclusion that Jefferson's preamble and letter to the Danbury
Baptists defined the religion clauses. The Court does not admit that
Madison's initial proposal of the First Amendment to the first Congress
was revised after much debate, and only later became the language
embodied in the First Amendment and adopted in 1789. 43 Jefferson's
36, Jd. at 163.
37. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 163. The Court acknowledged that Jefferson was in France at the time of
the Convention. Id.
40. Id. at 164.
41. "Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the
measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect
of the amendment thus secured." Id. at 164.
42. Id. at 164.
43. Madison first proposed that Art.I. § 9 be amended to add: "The civil rights of
[Vol. 112:3
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letter to the Danbury Baptists, which came "afterwards," was written in
1 802. 4 An important question left unanswered after Reynolds is why the
Court concluded that the Virginia experience alone purportedly gave
birth to the ideological underpinnings of the First Amendment, a
question that the Court purported to answer in its first modem
Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board of Education.4 5
Everson v. Board of Education marked the Court's incorporation of
the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment and
ushered in the Court's modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence 46 In
Everson, the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a
New Jersey statute and school board resolution authorizing the use of
public funds to reimburse parents for the cost of bus transportation to
parochial schools.47 To determine the meaning of "establishment," as
much as to remind modem Americans of the "evils, fears, and political
problems" that drove the Framers to create the Establishment Clause, the
Court tentatively began with a review of the history introduced in
Reynolds surrounding the framing and adoption of the Establishment
Clause.48
Justice Black's account of First Amendment history in Everson was
much lengthier than the version in Reynolds, shading in more detail
while generalizing about the sentiments of "freedom-loving colonials"
49
towards the persecution of religious dissenters in the various state
establishments.5 ° Justice Black's opinion also settled on Virginia as the
locus of meaning for the religion clauses, and the opinion went a step
further than Reynolds in explaining why the Virginia experience should
define the Establishment Clause.
51
Justice Black's opinion echoed Reynolds in the assertion that the
religion clauses of the First Amendment were coextensive with the goals
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner,
or on any pretext, infringed." 1 Annals of Cong. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association
in the state of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802).
45. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
46. See generally id.
47. Everson, 330 U.S. 1. at 8-15.
48. Id. at 8 ("Once again, therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review the
background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language was
fashioned and adopted.") (citing in a footnote Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 162 and a tax case,
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)).
49. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
50. Id. In a footnote, the Court quoted a letter in which Madison expressed contempt
for persecution and a longing for "liberty of conscience to all." Id. at 11, n. 9.
51. According to the Court, in Virginia "[T]he established church had achieved a
dominant influence in political affairs and.., many excesses attracted wide public
attention .. " Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. See APPENDIX A for the full text of this passage.
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and protections of the Virginia bill.52 Following Reynolds, the Court
stated that Jefferson and Madison, as prominent voices in opposition to
the Virginia Assessment, both played "leading roles" in the drafting and
adoption of the First Amendment.53 Mentioning state establishments
after ratification of the First Amendment and controversies over public
funding of religious schools, the Court passed quickly through a
discussion of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation to return to its
discussion of the meaning of the Establishment Clause.54 According to
the Court, the same history, featuring Jefferson and Madison, defined the
Establishment Clause generally as erecting a "wall of separation between
church and state. 55
Beyond the task of unfolding and explicating the Establishment
Clause history, the real trouble for Justice Black was the application of
the history to the case. Though the rhetoric of the Everson opinion set
the Court firmly on the high wall separation course it would follow for
years to come, the Court ultimately concluded that the transportation
reimbursement payments did not violate the Establishment Clause.
5 6
Justice Jackson's dissent identified the conflict between the majority's
separationist language and its decision in the case, and revealed his view
of the bus payments as little more than a direct subsidy of the Catholic
Church.57 Justice Rutledge, writing in dissent, parsed the history
presented by Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson. 8 Rutledge
provided a readable account of Madison's opposition to the Virginia
assessment, Madison's support of Jefferson's bill, and his first proposal
of the First Amendment to the first Congress.59 Filling a hole left open in
Reynolds and in the Everson majority, Rutledge's dissent provided the
first authority for the proposition that Jefferson's Virginia bill was the
model for the First Amendment.6 °
Unlike the Court's earlier Establishment Clause history, however,
Rutledge's dissent focused on Madison rather than Jefferson as the lead
actor in the events leading up to the adoption of the First Amendment.
61
52. Id. at 13.
53. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13.
54. Id. at 13-15.
55. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 18-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 34 n. 11 (citing generally SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA (1939)); cf id. at 9 n.5 (majority opinion) (citing COBB for a different historical
proposition).
61. See, e.g., id. at 34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("In the documents of the times,
particularly of Madison, who was leader in the Virginia struggle before he became the
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In his dissent, Rutledge referred repeatedly to Madison and a generic
cohort of "followers" and "coworkers" who fought against the Virginia
assessment.6 2 Rutledge went as far as to append a copy of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance to his lengthy opinion, lest the reader "lose
sight of what [Madison] and his coworkers had in mind when.., they
forbade an establishment of religion and secured its free exercise ....
Rutledge characterized Madison's proposal to the First Congress as
merely an extension of his work in Virginia,64 giving Madison credit for
"secur[ing] the submission and ratification of the First Amendment as the
first article of our Bill of Rights."
65
Justice Rutledge relegated to a footnote the actual text of Madison's
initial proposal,6 6 which was far different from the opaque language of
the religion clauses adopted by the First Congress and ratified by the
states, and noted that "[i]n the process of debate this was modified to its
present form., 6 7 In fact, the evolution of the religion clauses and the
corresponding debate that is recorded, suggest that crediting Madison as
the sole author of the First Amendment without simultaneously
acknowledging the subsequent changes to his proposal seems dubious.
To the contrary, Rutledge mentioned the evolution of the language of the
religion clauses only one other time, in which he distinguished language
that could otherwise counsel against a broad interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.68
A defining feature of Justice Rutledge's use of history in his
Everson dissent was the application of the imprint of history to the facts
of the case, a sine qua non of law office historiography: "New Jersey's
action therefore exactly fits the type of exaction and the kind of evil at
Amendment's sponsor.., is to be found irrefutable confirmation of the Amendment's
sweeping content.").
62. Id. at 37-41.
63. Id. at 37-38.
64. Id. at 39 ("All the great instruments of the Virginia struggle for religious liberty
thus became warp and woof of our constitutional tradition, not simply by the course of
history, but by the common unifying force of Madison's life, thought and sponsorship.
He epitomized the whole of that tradition in the Amendment's compact, but nonetheless
comprehensive, phrasing.").
65. Id. The fact that the First Amendment originally was the third and not the first
article in the Bill of Rights also detracts from the historical credibility of the Rutledge
dissent, though it is a relatively minor point compared to the other assertions. Justice
Jackson attempted to make a similar point in his separate dissent, asserting that the First
Amendment came first because it was "first in the forefathers' minds." Id. at 26
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 39 n.27 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 42 n.34. Rutledge attempted to explain the language ,of an earlier
version, which read as follows: "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id.
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which Madison and Jefferson struck.,
6 9
2. Originalism as a Response to Everson
After an inconsistent line of decisions following the Burger Court's
1971 inauguration of the Lemon test, 70 the Court addressed legislative
prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.71 In Marsh, Nebraska legislator Ernest
Chambers challenged the practice of legislative prayer as well as the
payment of a legislative chaplaincy as violations of the Establishment
Clause. 72 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 6-3 majority, upheld the
legislative chaplaincy based on the history of legislative chaplaincies
present at the time of the framing of the First Amendment. 73 The Court's
use of history to decide the dispute was unexpected, to say the least,
given its heavy reliance in prior cases on the three-part test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman.
• Marsh returned the Court to a focus on history. Even though the
Chief Justice's opinion relied upon some of the same history as the
Everson line of cases, it interpreted the history differently. In a footnote,
Burger acknowledged Virginia as a colony that "took the lead in defining
religious rights. 75 He also noted that in addition to Virginia, Rhode
Island, founded by Roger Williams, had constitutional provisions on
religious freedom and maintained the practice of legislative prayer.76
Burger likewise observed that the Continental Congress and the First
Congress adopted the practice of legislative prayer.77 Rather than
making generalized statements about why the founders came to America
or what the framers of the First Amendment had in mind, Burger
supported the decision by the actions of the framers in authorizing paid
69. Id. at 46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
70. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("Three... tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."') (citations omitted). Immediately preceding the Lemon era was the Warren
Court's history-based decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing
in Establishment Clause cases proper in light of Establishment Clause history).
71. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
72. Id. at 785.
73. Id. at 786-95.
74. For some cases decided under Lemon immediately prior to the decision in
Marsh, see, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (decided 6 days before Marsh);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (previous term); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (using history, precedent, and Lemon test). See also Committee for
Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (some detour through
Everson history before applying Lemon test).
75. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787 n.5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 787-88.
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chaplains while finalizing the language of the First Amendment.7 8 The
opinion recognized Madison as a drafter of the Establishment Clause and
acknowledged him as one of "the men who wrote the First Amendment
Religion Clauses. 7 9 Jefferson, on the other hand, was not mentioned in
the Court's opinion.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Marsh was in no sense a perfect
model of historical analysis. Yet the historical flaws were arguably less
controversial in Marsh because the fit between the history and the
practice of legislative prayer was tighter than it had been in Everson and
subsequent cases. Although Burger's opinion in Marsh assumed that the
framers serving in the First Congress approved of legislative prayer with
an awareness of the constitutionality of their actions, this was not an
outlandish leap of logic given the proximity in time between their
legislative act and the adoption of the Establishment Clause. 81 Justice
Brennan's dissent also raised the important question of whether the
actions of the ratifying States, rather than that of the First Congress,
should be used to interpret the Establishment Clause.82 The real fight,
however, was over whether the history should be dispositive at all.
83
In the very next term, the Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly.84 Lynch
involved a Pawtucket, Rhode Island creche erected as part of a public
Christmas display.85 The Court reversed the First Circuit's decision that
the municipality's maintenance of the creche display endorsed religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause.86 Building on the reasoning in
Marsh, Chief Justice Burger stressed the "unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of
religion in American life from at least 1 789.,,87 Burger cited a catalog of
references to religion that included George Washington's Thanksgiving
Proclamation, national Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, "In God
We Trust" on currency, "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance,
religious paintings in public art galleries, and the frieze of Moses and the
Ten Commandments in the Supreme Court building.88 Against this
78. Id. at 788; see also id. at 790 ("In this context, historical evidence sheds light not
only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how
they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress-their
actions reveal their intent.").
79. Id. at 788, n.8.
80. See id. at 784-95.
81. But see Green, supra note 3, at 1724-25.
82. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 815 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 816-17.
84. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. Id. at 671.
86. Id. at 672.
87. Id. at 674.
88. Id. at 675-77.
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backdrop, the Court found that the Pawtucket creche easily passed the
Lemon test.
89
An important feature of the Lynch opinion was the Court's heavy
reliance on tradition and its minimal engagement with precedent. The
Court limited its discussion of the First Amendment history to a repeat of
the evidence adduced in Marsh concerning legislative prayer. 90 Thus,
unlike Marsh, the opinion lacked any secure fit between the history and
the practice-a point Justice Brennan sharply exploited in his dissent91-
requiring the Court to go beyond the framing history to support its
decision. The Court justified its decision with the post-framing, general
tradition of religious acknowledgment, concluding that in light of
decades of tradition, it was "far too late in the day" to interpret the
Establishment Clause to forbid an acknowledgment such as the creche.92
By contrast, in applying Lemon's prong forbidding the effect of
advancing religion, Justice Burger argued that to invalidate the public
creche would mean that the cr&he was "more beneficial to and more an
endorsement of religion" than other practices that the Court had
previously upheld.93 This questionable "no more than" reasoning reveals
the limited role of precedent under an approach explicitly justified by
history and tradition.
As the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine returned to history, its
confrontation with Everson was perhaps inevitable. It was then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree94 which
challenged the Court's exposition of Establishment Clause history in
Everson. Voicing the misgivings of earlier opinions95 and attempting to
89. Id. at 679-86.
90. See also id. at 719-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the absence in the Lynch
majority opinion of the history of the public display of nativity scenes and the paucity of
evidence on the Framer's intent).
91. See id. at 725. Ironically, Justice Brennan accused the Court of using history to
achieve precisely the kind of activism that is usually associated with the living
Constitutionalist method of interpretation:
[O]ur prior decisions which relied upon concrete, specific historical evidence to
support a particular practice simply have no bearing on the question presented
in this case. Contrary to today's careless decision, those prior cases have all
recognized that the "illumination" provided by history must always be focused
on the particular practice at issue in a given case. Without that guiding
principle and the intellectual discipline it imposes, the Court is at sea, free to
select random elements of America's varied history solely to suit the views of
five Members of this Court.
Id. at 725.
92. Id. at 687 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 681-82.
94. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
95. For example, in Justice Stewart's Schempp dissent, he rejoined the incorporation
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make good on his threat to reduce the scope of the Establishment Clause,
Rehnquist stated:
96
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately
the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas
Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional
Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress
and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the
Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any
detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history
as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
97
Justice Rehnquist, like Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, fixed
his view on Madison rather than Jefferson as a source of understanding
nonestablishment. Rather than focusing on the Virginia assessment
controversy, however, Rehnquist outlined the evolution of the language
of the First Amendment.98  Rehnquist's opinion demonstrated that
Madison did not champion a "wall of separation" agenda in his
proposals, nor in the debates on the floor of Congress, notwithstanding
his disdain for the Virginia assessment.99  Rehnquist characterized
debate, noting that the Establishment Clause was adopted as a limitation on the National
Government and was not intended to affect existing state establishments. Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Unlike
Clark's majority opinion and Brennan's concurrence in that case, Justice Stewart did not
attempt to provide any principles based on what the Framers intended. Of course,
Stewart's failure to connect the Framers with his conclusions certainly follows from his
brief explanation of the history itself, which would suggest, consistent with later
historical interpretations, that the Framers did not intend to affect state practices at all.
See scholarship cited infra at 220. Stewart acknowledged his reluctant acceptance of the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, noting only the irony of its enforcement
against the states given its history. Id. Revealing a philosophical divide on the Court,
Justice Stewart used historical arguments as a type of reality-check against what he
termed mechanistic applications of the Establishment Clause. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415 (1963) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (characterizing the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as
"mechanistic" and "historically unsound"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-50 (1962)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
96. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720-27
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Free Exercise Clause) (opining in dissent that both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses had been interpreted too broadly in the Court's
doctrine). For an account of the lead up to Rehnquist's dissent in Jaffree and the
scholarly response, see Lee Strang's introduction to the Notre Dame symposium, Lee J.
Strang, The (Re)Turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1697, 1703-05 (2006).
97. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Id.at92-100.
99. Id. at 92-99.
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Everson's wall metaphor as "bad history" that did not reflect the intent of
the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment. 100 Instead, Rehnquist
offered his own originalist account of the Establishment Clause history;
he cited, among others, the Northwest Ordinance, George Washington's
Thanksgiving Proclamation and the Congressional Resolution calling for
it, Congressional appropriation of funds in the 18th and 19 th centuries to
support sectarian education for Indian tribes, and the constitutional law
commentaries of Justice Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley.' ° 'The
evidence that Rehnquist marshaled in support of his position repudiated
Everson's requirement of neutrality between religion and non-religion.0 2
Still, Rehnquist's non-preferentialist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, that the clause only "... forbade establishment- of a national
religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or
denominations,"'
1 3 remains controversial.
10 4
Rehnquist's originalist approach differed in character from the
Court's earlier forays into history; it followed a premise-evidence-
conclusion format that lacked the rhetorical zeal of Everson's colorful
narrative. The critical tone would be taken up by originalist Justices
Scalia and Thomas, often in dissent, in later cases concerning the
meaning of the Establishment Clause.
10 5
3. Living Constitutionalist History
To understand the living Constitutionalist approach to
Establishment Clause history, it is necessary to return to the era of
Everson and to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp,'0 6 which was itself a defense of the
Court's Establishment Clause history.
10 7
Relying explicitly on Jefferson's wall of separation as the lesson of
the history set forth in Everson, in the following term the Court
invalidated a release-time program in the Illinois public school system.
08
100. Id. at 107-08.
101. Id. at 99-106.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 106.
104. See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 3, at 138 (characterizing Rehnquist's position as an
appeal to a "culturally conservative-some might even say xenophobic- tradition").
105. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-41 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority failed to apply the Establishment Clause consistent with its
historical meaning, the Framers having intended only to prohibit at the federal level
coercion of religious orthodoxy and financial support "by force of law").
106. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
107. See infra text accompanying note 118.
108. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see also id. at 211,
231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); but see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (off-
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The Court took up the issue of public school prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 109
in the context of a New York school board's policy of daily recitation of
a nonsectarian "Regents' prayer."'110 Justice Black's majority opinion
compared the prayer in the case to The Book of Common Prayer used in
the Sixteenth Century Church of England and concluded that the practice
of government-composed prayer was one that the founders fled Europe
to avoid."' Justice Black briefly recounted the Court's now familiar
ideological history of disestablishment. 112 Instead of making specific
claims on behalf of Jefferson or Madison like the previous opinions in
Reynolds and Everson, however, Justice Black spoke more generally
about the founders and what they knew, understood, and intended."
13
Black used history to derive the aims of the Establishment Clause, which
yielded the decision in the case.
1 14
In the very next term, the Court heard School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, "5 which, like Engel, involved daily Bible reading
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Given the similarity between the
facts in Engel and Schempp, it seemed that the Court's grant of certiorari
in Schempp had been either to overrule or reaffirm the previous term's
decision in Engel.'16 Justice Clark's majority opinion in the case referred
to the general history of the Establishment Clause, and gruffly
acknowledged commentators by characterizing criticism of the Court's
methodology as "entirely untenable and of value only as academic
exercises."' 17  Justice Brennan, responding directly to Court critics,
however, wrote a separate, 74-page concurrence designed to situate the
Court's school prayer cases within its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and to justify the decisions in Engel and Schempp with
reference to the history of the framing of the First Amendment." 8 The
campus release time program constitutional).
109. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Court had avoided on standing grounds a similar case
involving Bible reading in Doremus v. Board of Ed., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
110. Id.at 423.
111. Id.at425-28.
112. Id. at 425-29. This time the Court acknowledged that "[s]imilar though less far-
reaching legislation was being considered and passed in other States." Id. at 428-29
(citing COBB, supra note 60, at 482-509).
113. See id. at 429-33. Of the few footnotes that support Black's discussion of the
generalized attitudes of the founders toward religious establishments, most cite
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance. See id. at 431-32 n. 13-14, 432 n. 15-16.
114. Engel, 370 U.S. at433.
115. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
116. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT 466 (N.Y. Univ. Press) (1983) (quoting Justice Harlan at oral argument in
Schempp: "What these cases really present is the question whether we are going to
reexamine the past cases.").
117. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217.
118. Id. at 232-304 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The importance of the issue and the
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tone of Justice Brennan's concurrence confirms its character as a
refutation of the critics; Brennan book-ended his lengthy opinion with
the observation that the Court's decisions in Engel and Schempp had
been neither "radical" nor "novel."' 19
Brennan expressed great confidence in his historical claims at a
certain level of generality, but his opinion expressly disclaimed any
absolute doctrinal propositions based on history. Brennan explained that
"an awareness of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding
Fathers" could not always be utilized to solve "concrete problems. ' 2 °
Justice Brennan candidly asserted that, in particular, the increase in
religious pluralism required a more modem understanding of the
Establishment Clause than the perspectives presumably held by the
founders.1 21 Read together with the Court's opinion in Engel, Brennan's
concurring opinion in Schempp created a bridge between the stamp-
imprint law office history of earlier decisions and later methodology
based on the generalized historical purposes of the Establishment
Clause.122 Though Brennan's Schempp concurrence sometimes backslid
into speaking through the framers, 23 it was an important justification of
living Constitutionalist visions of the Establishment Clause, imposing a
sort of filter on history based on relevance and need. In later opinions he
deep conviction with which views on both sides are held seem to me to justify detailing at
some length my reasons for joining the Court's judgment and opinion."). See also
SCHWARTZ, supra note 116, at 466-67 ("The March 1 conference revealed a consensus
not to overrule Engel. But concern was expressed that Engel had not fully explored the
history and development of the Establishment Clause as it bore upon cases like those
before the Court. Brennan in particular asked whether it could be demonstrated that the
Founding Fathers meant to forbid some forms of religious activities and manifestations in
public institutions while permitting other forms to survive.").
119. Id. at 274, 304. Brennan's concurring opinion alone contained 78 footnotes with
references to cases, law review articles, and other scholarly works.
120. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring). "Whatever Jefferson or Madison would
have thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public
schools existed in their day, our use of the history of their time must limit itself to broad
purposes, not specific practices.... It is 'a constitution we are expounding,' and our
interpretation of the First Amendment must necessarily be responsive to the much more
highly charged nature of religious questions in contemporary society." Id. at 241
(emphasis added).
121. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. See cases discussed infra at II.C.
123. For example, in a subsection discussing "Religious Considerations in Public
Programs," no doubt distinguishing his majority opinion in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), decided the same day, Brennan asserted that the "Framers" would not have
deemed free exercise exemptions from general welfare programs to be religious
establishments. While Brennan may have been referring to the framers' general
purposes, his assertion flew directly into the net of critics like Kelley, who pointed out
the obvious fact that the framers had no opinions concerning the general welfare
programs of the 20th Century.
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would decry betrayal of the "lessons of history,"'' 24 just as Justices
following in his interpretive vein would speak of the need for a "sense of
the past."'
' 25
Justice Souter, a strong living Constitutionalist voice on the Court,
carried forward Brennan's notions about the limits of history. Likewise,
Souter confronted some of the assumptions underlying Rehnquist's
critique of Everson. In his concurrence in the Court's graduation prayer
case, 126 Justice Souter responded directly to Rehnquist's originalist
account of the Establishment Clause drafting history with a cogent
textual argument. Rather than interpreting the prior versions of the First
Amendment to explain what the framers had in mind, Souter used the
versions to show what they explicitly rejected-an Establishment Clause
that forbade "a national religion," the preference of "one religious sect,"
or the promotion of "articles of faith.' ' 127  Justice Souter candidly
admitted that modem day judges cannot profess to know why the framers
settled on the precise language of the Establishment Clause.
128
Nonetheless, Souter aligned himself with historian Leonard Levy 129 who,
contrary to Rehnquist's cited historian Robert Cord,130 read the evolution
of the drafts to preclude a weak Establishment Clause. 13 1 Otherwise,
Souter reasoned, the framers would have been "extraordinarily bad
drafters" who purposely avoided the wording that could have conveyed
their true meaning. Souter and Rehnquist spoke the same language,
but Souter's approach to history depended on the strength of the Court's
prior Establishment Clause decisions and not merely history. 133 Souter
relied heavily on Madison and Jefferson to show a lack of consensus
among the founders concerning the propriety of government
124. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816-17 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority's historical methodology).
125. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844,
876 (Souter, J.).
126. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
127. Id. at 614, 612-16 (Souter, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 615-16, 626.
129. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986).
130. ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (Baker Book House 1988) (1982).
131. LEVY,supra note 129.
132. Lee, 505 U.S. at 615 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Doug Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 875, 882-83 (1986)). In a footnote, Justice Souter addressed the rest of
Rehnquist's historical evidence in Wallace, concluding that members of the First
Congress, as well as Presidents and other public officials, did not necessarily act with
Establishment Clause principle in mind. Lee, 505 U.S. at 616 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring).
133. See infra notes 135.
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acknowledgment of religion. 134 Rather than turn to tradition in the soft
spots where history did not fully support his positions, Justice Souter
reminded the reader that to reconsider the Clause in light of history
would upset settled law. 135  Thus, precedent, when not supported by




The importance of precedent to living Constitutionalists was
highlighted in the Ten Commandments cases decided at the end of the
Court's 2004-2005 term. 137  After 60 years of an incorporated
Establishment Clause, the Justices openly debated their positions on the
use of history, shedding more heat than light on what was, by then, an
old dispute. But the argument brought into focus important differences
between the history of the originalists and that of the living
Constitutionalists.
To invalidate the Ten Commandments display in McCreary County,
Justice Souter turned not to history but to the Lemon purpose prong, a
rarely used tool in the Court's arsenal. 138  Souter explained that the
majority's decision could be squared with the general concerns of the
framers, but he clearly did not claim to have achieved an originalist
interpretation or result. 139 Rather, Justice Souter alluded to a "sense of
the past,"'' 40 and defended neutrality as a means of "keeping sight of
something the Framers of the First Amendment thought important."'
141
Responding directly to Justice Scalia's dissent, Souter criticized
originalist interpretations of the Establishment Clause as lacking support
134. See id.
135. Lee, 505 U.S at 610 (Souter, J., concurring) ("In barring the State from
sponsoring generically theistic prayers where it could not sponsor sectarian ones, we hold
true to a line of precedent from which there is no adequate historical case to depart."); id.
at 622 (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original) ("The setting in which the
Establishment Clause was framed, and the [political] practices [of the Framers following
ratification] warrant canvassing, but while they yield some evidence for petitioner's
argument, they do not reveal the degree of consensus in early constitutional thought that
would raise a threat to stare decisis . .
136. Id.
137. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (In McCreary, the stormy evolution of the display evinced a religious purpose on
the part of lawmakers and it was invalidated); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(In Van Orden, the 43 year old capitol monument situated in a park with 17 other
displays was upheld.).
138. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 844.
139. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874-77.
140. Id. at 876.
141. Id..
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from the "full range" of information on what the framers believed.
142
Citing acts and writings of Jefferson and Madison, Justice Souter
concluded that there was no consensus on the meaning of
nonestablishment that could support moving away from the tradition of
neutrality. 143 Souter advocated a very general role for history rather than
the specific, outcome-determinative role suggested by the originalists.
44
Adding a candid flavor to Brennan's point in his Schempp dissent, Souter
warned that a thorough inquiry into the framers' understanding of the
Establishment Clause would substantiate Rehnquist's undesirable earlier
thesis: that the Framers only intended to protect Protestant Christian
sects from government favoritism of one sect over another. 1
45
At several points in the opinion, Souter warned that following
Justice Scalia's originalist approach would overturn all of the Court's
Establishment Clause decisions since Everson that applied the neutrality
principle. 146 Justice Souter closed the opinion with reference both to
precedent and modem times, blending his doubts about the usefulness of
history with arguments about the virtues of the neutrality principle:
"Historical evidence thus supports no solid argument for changing
course ... whereas public discourse at the present time certainly raises
no doubt about the value of the interpretive approach invoked for 60
years now. ,
14 7
Justice Scalia's dissent, perhaps the most controversial church/state
opinion in recent times, made the originalist case for the Ten
Commandments in part by taking the position that the government may
favor monotheism. 14  Scalia marshaled data to support his claim about
the intellectual history of the founding era, asserting that "[t]hose who
wrote the Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-
being of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way to
foster morality."'149 Against a compilation of history and tradition, Scalia
142. Id.
143. Id. at 877-81.
144. See infra text accompanying note 147.
145. Id. at 881; see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 876-8 1.
147. Id. at 881. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor sounded a similar theme,
defending the Court's Establishment Clause precedent in light of the Framers' general
ideas about religious liberty and world conditions of unrest in other places. Id. at 881-84
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. "[I]t is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment
Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists." Id. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 887 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted the phrase, "so help me
God," added by George Washington to the Presidential oath by George Washington. Id.
at 886. Scalia also noted the openings of the Supreme Court ("God save the United
States and this Honorable Court") and Congress (legislative prayer), legislation to
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flatly rejected the Court's own precedent requiring neutrality: "Nothing
stands behind the Court's assertion that governmental affirmation of the
society's belief in God is unconstitutional except the Court's own say-so,
citing as support only the unsubstantiated say-so of earlier Courts going
back no further than the mid-20th century."'
150
Justice Stevens was ready with an answer, and the exchange
between Stevens in Van Orden and Scalia in McCreary represents the
impasse at which most Establishment Clause originalists and living
Constitutionalists stand: "The task of applying the broad principles that
the Framers wrote into the text of the First Amendment is, in any event,
no more a matter of personal preference than is one's selection between
two (or more) sides in a heated historical debate."'
151
The foregoing cases demonstrate two discernable approaches to
history in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, several points
of disagreement, and the tensions those disagreements create in the
doctrine. In the following Part, I attempt to view the disagreement in
light of issues raised in the discipline of history-working toward a
solution to the problem of the Court's use of history in Establishment
Clause cases.
II. The Problem of History
A. Optimism and Pessimism
1. The Originalists
"History is not history unless it is the truth." Abraham Lincoln
152
To both originalists and living Constitutionalists, history provides a
framework within which to consider the meaning of very abstract
provide paid chaplains to the House and Senate, as well as a Congressional request for
the President to proclaim a day of prayer to "Almighty God." Id. Scalia noted President
Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation, and the Northwest Territory Ordinance of
1787 containing approbatory language concerning religion and morality. Id. at 886-87.
In addition to other historical materials, he quoted portions of Madison's first and
Jefferson's second inaugural addresses containing explicit references to a deified "Being"
responsible for the direction and prosperity of America. Id. at 888. Justice Scalia found
continuity between historical references to religion and modem practices, including paid
chaplains and legislative prayer, "In God We Trust" in coins, and, not without
controversy, "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 889.
150. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 734 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Ferenc M. Szasz, Quotes About History, http:/ihnn.us/articles/1328.html (last
visited July 30, 2007); JOSEPH FORT NEwTON, LINCOLN AND HERNDON 314 (1910).
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language.153 The text itself contains no definition, so it would seem
sensible to turn to the history of the creation, adoption, and ratification of
the language to determine what it means. How seriously one takes that
history in ascribing meaning to the Clause is likely determined by how
straightforward one perceives the task of uncovering and applying the
history, and how committed one may be to the principle that the history
should be determinative, and that, in some cases, is dependent upon how
cheerfully one is willing to view the history. In a symposium piece
dedicated to the "dead hand problem," i.e., the issue of whether the
decisions of long dead framers and ratifiers should govern people and
institutions in the present, Michael McConnell characterizes originalism
as a response that simply "defend(s) the legitimacy of the dead hand."
154
McConnell says of the originalist perspective that "the people of 1787
had an original right to establish a government for themselves and their
posterity," and therefore "the words they wrote should be interpreted-to
the best of our ability-as they meant them." 155 Upon surveying the
historical evidence, Raoul Berger asserts that the founders intended
future generations to be bound by their meaning. 156 He concludes that
"original intention is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law" and it
"serves as a brake on judges' imposition of their personal preferences
under the guise of interpretation."'157 Originalists admit that there are
areas in which history fails to provide satisfactory answers, but they
optimistically face the task of pressing on in search of the answers that
are available.
158
153. Cf. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S.
844 (2005). Mounting his response to Scalia's originalist account in dissent, Souter
acknowledged limited agreement "on the need for some interpretive help. The First
Amendment contains no textual definition of 'establishment,' and the term is certainly
not self-defining." Id. at 874.
154. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1998).
155. Id. at 1132. Michael Paulsen summarizes the approach as one that involves
"giving to the Constitution's words and phrases the meaning they would have had, in
context, to informed readers of the language at the time of their adoption as law, within
the relevant political community" and argues that such method is dictated by the text of
the Constitution itself. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (And
How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056 (2006) (reviewing Akhil Amar, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2006) and Jed Rubenfeld, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006)); see also SCALIA, supra, note
26; Antonin Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
156. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402-21 (2d ed. 1997). In the second edition, Berger updates
several chapters to respond to charges from critics in the twenty years since the original
publication of his book and takes particular issue with the work of H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
157. Id. at 421.
158. See generally SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 26.
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Nonetheless, the phrase "founder worship" that is popular with
critics of originalism reveals their view that the originalists' devotion to
history is misplaced.159 Whether critics of originalism are responding to
a sanguine view of history or to a principled belief about the process of
constitutional interpretation, or both, one thing seems clear: the
originalist rarely engages the issue of whether history reflects practices
that are relevant or desirable today.
2. The Living Constitutionalists
Myth, memory, history-these are three alternative ways to capture
and account for an elusive past, each with its own persuasive
claim.
160
Optimists are seldom deterred by the prospect of law office history;
if anything, they are motivated to do better history. But pessimists have
little confidence in the use of Establishment Clause history, and find
instead that it serves only the purpose of justifying a predetermined
outcome. 161  In George Orwell's Animal Farm, 62 he describes the
159. This theme comes through clearly in Charles Miller's pre-originalism critique of
"intent history" as he (somewhat sardonically) describes the significance of the founders
in the modem American mind: "In the beginning was the Constitution; and the
Constitution was with the Founding Fathers; and the Constitution was the Founding
Fathers." MILLER, supra note 2, at 181.
160. Warren I. Susman, quoted in Szasz, Many Meanings, Part I, supra, note 1, at
560; http://historynewsnetwork.org/articles/1328.html (last visited December 29, 2007).
161. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901 (1993).
162. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Harcourt Inc. 1946) (Perhaps a few readers
will indulge the author's brief retelling of the story: After the revolution, the pigs, as the
smartest of the animals, create the rules to be followed and the ceremonies to be
preserved under the new government. The pigs distill the tenets of their beliefs in a set of
"commandments" and a six stanza song, and for those such as the sheep who can
remember neither the rules nor the words of the song, a single mantra-"four legs good,
two legs ba-a-a-d"-suffices to preserve the message. As the pigs create new rules and
decrees, they justify them with reference to the recent history of the revolution, such as
an impassioned speech by old Major, a deceased boar and the patriarch of "animalism."
Or they recount how the animals fought bravely to defend an attack by the humans. The
other animals always accept the oral histories recited by the pigs, and agree after some
persuasion that whatever new law or decree the pigs introduce is justified and necessary.
A problem arises, however, because the pigs who control the history blatantly change it,
such as when animals who were heroes in the original version of a story later become
villains. And they change the rules without admitting that there has ever been a change,
such as when the commandment "no animal shall kill another animal," is later given
without explanation as "no animal shall kill another animal without cause."). Animal
Farm, believed to be Orwell's thinly-veiled allegory of the Russian Revolution, clearly
cautions against the rewriting of history. See MITZI M. BRUNSDALE, STUDENT
COMPANION TO GEORGE ORWELL 121-36, (2000) (noting that in an earlier work Orwell
expressed concerns that "'the very concept of objective truth is fading out of the
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animals of the English Manor Farm who soon overthrow their owner and
master, a human. In Orwell's story, the pigs are the animals which
manipulate history to persuade the other animals to follow their
particular post-revolutionary agenda. 63 A cynic could easily overlay the
work of the Court onto the characters in Orwell's story, 164 revealing the
use of history to justify the creation of a doctrine or to create an artificial
sense of continuity with the past. Take, for example, Justice Brennan's
cobbling together of Court precedent, state court decisions, history, and
tradition in his Schempp concurrence to support his repeated claim that
the Court's decision in Engel had not been radical or novel. 65  Or,
consider Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Marsh, purporting to follow
most of the same history explicated in Everson while breaking
dramatically from the doctrinal path created by that case.
166
For many that question the use of history, however, there is
something more troubling than law office-style manipulation of history.
For these individuals, the use of history raises the specter of what lies
beneath, that is, what "an honest fealty to history"'167 would tend to reveal
about the Establishment Clause. With language echoing Justices
Souter's approach to the Ten Commandments cases, Stephen Gey, for
example, asserts that fidelity to history "will yield an Establishment
Clause that no religiously pluralistic modem democracy would want or
accept. ' ' 168 While historians have warned against asking questions of the
past that the past cannot answer, living Constitutionalists worry that
world."').
163. See ORWELL, supra note 162, at 154.
164. Kelley, in his 1965 article, connected the subject of Orwell's political satire to
the work of the Warren Court. See Kelley, supra note 19, at 157. ("To put the matter
differently, the present use of history by the Court is a Marxist-type perversion of the
relation between truth and utility. It assumes that history can be written to serve the
interests of libertarian idealism. The whole process calls to mind the manipulation of
scientific truth by the Soviet government in the Lysenko controversy. The Court's
purposes may be more laudable and the politics involved less spectacular, but the
assumptions about the nature of reality are the same.").
165. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 274, 304 (1963).
Certainly, there were scholars who considered it to be both. For critical commentary
predating Engel and Schempp, see, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions,
14 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 44 (1949). For a detailed list of religion clause
scholarship during the period following Everson (1948-1953), and during the period
following Engel and Schempp (1962-1965), see Lee J. Strang, The (Re) Turn to History in
Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1697, 1702 n.34 (2006)
(symposium introduction).
166. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). This largely has been my
students' interpretation. Whether defending or attacking the results in particular cases,
many students over the years have concluded that the Court has used history in its
Establishment Clause decisions to justify result-oriented opinions.
167. Gey, supra note 3, at 1631.
168. Id.
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history cannot provide the "right" answers.' 69 Witness, from another
context, progressive history professor Eric Foner's observation that
Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was "certainly plausible" as
history.170 For the principled pessimist, this conclusion about the
function and the nature of Establishment Clause history necessarily leads
to a mode of constitutional interpretation that would either disregard
history altogether, or relegate it to a symbolic role. 171 And it is precisely
this perceived disregard of an external restraint such as history that
makes originalists so nervous.
17 2
When the F3ast no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in
darkness.
Though the optimists and pessimists rarely seem to be on the same
page, they each have experienced the "lure of history"'' 74 and that history
has found its way into the opinions of the Court in many Establishment
Clause cases.175 The optimists can besmirch the pessimists for asserted
lack of principle while the pessimists condemn the optimists to failure,
but until either side is willing to move in the direction of the other, no
significant agreement will be reached. For those who lack the optimism
of the originalists and reject the pessimism of the living
Constitutionalists, however, the discussion of the role of history in the
Court's Establishment Clause decisions is not quite finished. The
scholar or jurist who would attempt to navigate the water between the
optimists and the pessimists must first acknowledge what the optimists
and pessimists both accept, albeit on different levels-that there is value
in history. 176 We are indeed removed from the founders and framers, and
we cannot begin to understand the complexities of the world in which
they lived. One generation is always removed from the history of
previous generations, just as one day will never replicate the one that
came before it. But this observation when applied to history in law
would also tend to undermine the living Constitution approach, given its
169. Id.
170. ERiC FONER, WHO OwNs HISTORY? 177 (2002) ("Dred Scott may have been
morally reprehensible, but it was good constitutional law-if, that is, good constitutional
law means continually reenacting the principles and prejudices of the founding fathers").
171. See supra Part I.B.3
172. Cf. SCALIA, supra note 26, at 113 (contribution by Mary Ann Glendon) ("...
Whom should we fear more: an aroused populace, or the vanguard who know better than
the people what the people should want?").
173. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOL. 1 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835), quoted in Szasz, Quotes About
History, supra note 152.
174. Green, supra note 3.
175. See supra Part I.A.
176. See generally supra Part I.B.
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heavy reliance on precedent.
177
To conclude that answers from history are inaccessible to modem
generations is to assume that there is no continuity in the human
experience. By contrast, history is a type of anchor that we would do
well not to abandon. William Wiecek, no fan of originalism,
178
summarizes the point as he cautiously concludes that history can be
useful: "The past can be known, and it has an integrity that must be
respected. Though these two basic propositions are often abused by
being treated simplistically, they are true, and stand as our assurance
against the unprincipled relativism that produces law-office history."'
179
The assertion that the narrative of our constitutional past is too
exclusionary for contemporary relevance involves a distinct type of
relativism, which prefers history that is "good" as a matter of substance
over history that is "bad."' 80 A more coherent response to the assertedly
exclusionary nature of the Court's Establishment Clause history would
be to include more facts in the historical analysis,' 81 to examine them
more carefully, and to critically evaluate their modem relevance. In
exchange for the exclusionary Establishment Clause history, however,
the pessimists thus far have offered little in return. While the optimists
should take this claim more seriously than they have in the past, the
pessimists should follow it through with some positive alternative.
Both the optimists and the pessimists can benefit from an approach
that permits consensus where possible, civil disagreement where
consensus is not possible, and open-mindedness toward difficult
questions. More importantly, once the optimists and pessimists are
speaking the same language, their audience can better evaluate the
177. Jeffries' and Ryan's political history, for example, certainly casts Everson in a
negative light. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 3.
178. See infra Part 11. B.1.
179. Wiecek, supra note 18, at 268.
180. See generally Van Orden v. Perry 545 U.S. 677, 707-737 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
181. For those who have spent time with the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine, it
is difficult to envision a world in which the views of Jefferson and Madison and a few
select others do not reign supreme. What we choose to privilege as history, however,
influences doctrinal outcomes more than squabbles over whether Madison really believed
that legislative chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. Just as some working within
the discipline of history have challenged the traditional focus of historical works, the
proposal in this article provides the opportunity for those who are interested in opening a
discussion about what counts as history in the context of the Establishment Clause. Some
have already attempted to begin that discussion. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (arguing that the relevant history is that surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First Amendment); see also Richard Albert,
Beyond the Conventional Establishment Clause Narrative, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 329
(2005) (purporting to apply Lash's interpretive framework).
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substance of their respective historical and doctrinal claims. But how do
they go about speaking the same language-that is, how can two
divergent approaches to history find some common ground in which to
function? The discipline of history may offer some insight into this
particular aspect of the problem.
B. Applications from the Discipline of History
1. The Historian's Objectivity
As one might expect, historians have weighed in on both sides of
the division on constitutional interpretation. Historians like Kelley, for
example, who renounced law office history were not necessarily
proponents of originalism.' 82  At least part of the issue that some
historians take with orginalism (though this apparently was not Kelley's
problem 83) may be attributed to the erosion of the canon of objectivity
within their discipline, which creates a seemingly irreconcilable conflict
with the assumptions underlying originalist methodology. 184  William
Wiecek, for example, presumably takes a swipe at originalists when he
refers to "non-historians" engaging in the assumptions that facts are
objectively knowable, that the past exists independent of its
interpretation, and that "the application of the past to the present is
essentially a matter of getting the facts straight."' 8 5  According to
Wiecek, such facts ".... take on meaning only through interpretation,"
which ". . . begins with the way the historian asks questions, and at all
stages is influenced by the historian's own biases (including
ideology)."'' 86 In the context of the Establishment Clause, Steven Green
makes essentially the same point, calling for judges and lawyers to
"acknowledge that all historical accounts are selective and interpretive-
that 'objective facts' or 'historical truths' do not exist."'' 87 Ambivalence
about the role of the historian's lens has left many with real doubts about
182. See Kelley, supra note 19, at 157 (advocating "the application of precedent, legal
continuity, and balanced contemporary socio-political theory" and a "more sophisticated
and restrained approach to the use of history").
183. Richards locates Kelley's work within the canon of objectivity, and many of
Kelley's conclusions appear to confirm Richards' analysis. See Richards, supra note 24,
at 818; Kelley, supra note 19.
184. For a thorough discussion of the objectivity crisis, see G. Edward White, The
Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002); PETER
NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
185. Wiecek, supra, note 18, at 266-67.
186. Id. at 267.
187. Green, supra note 3, at 1733.
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the use of history.
It would seem wise, therefore, to acknowledge this problem of
perspective, though it is hardly fatal to history-based adjudication. For
one thing, some facts are both objectively true and knowable:
88
Jefferson wrote a letter to the Danbury Baptists. 189  The House and
Senate approved the language of what is now the First Amendment on
September 25, 1789.190 And so on. It is the selection, arrangement and
interpretation of those facts that invite bias. On the other hand, more
complicated factual assertions, say, that "Madison's advocacy ... shows
that the principle of federalism was by no means the main force behind
what became the First Amendment,
' 91 are inherently interpretive.
192
When a judge or Justice, in writing an opinion, presents basic historical
facts, he is engaged in the process of assembling a historical record to
reach a particular decision. As discussed below, transparency could be
achieved by forcing the opinion writer to disclose his choices and
interpretation. When an authoring judge uses a historian's or academic's
historical account, transparency could be achieved by requiring the
opinion writer to acknowledge the source, and perhaps any reputation of
distinction pertaining to the work or one that its author may have earned
as a partisan or ideologue. 193 Finally, in both cases, the opinion writer
should provide, when reasonably available, any contrary interpretations
of historical evidence or contrary historical accounts.
2. The Historian's Methodology
In thinking about how to synchronize the Court's approaches to
history in light of the concerns raised about objectivity, the discipline
itself offers guidance that follows naturally from the earlier discussion:
the opinion writer should "distinguish primary sources from secondary
works."' 194 Of course the distinction will be obvious to anyone reading
188. Such simple things such as dates and events are "true" and "knowable" to the
extent that anything that happened in the past can be known. See ROBERT JONES SHAFER,
A GUIDE TO HISTORICAL METHOD 19 (3d ed. 1980) (distinguishing between those things
that are metaphysical and those that are not).
189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802) in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 282 (H. Washington ed. 1861).
190. U.S. CONST. amend I.
191. LEVY, supra note 129, at 104-09 (reviewing the drafting history of the First
Amendment and discussing in particular the language "No State shall violate the equal
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.").
192. It has been said that to write an intellectual history is to try to "nail jelly to a
wall." NOVICK, supra note 184, at 7.
193. This could be particularly helpful in the case of work that is cited in Supreme
Court opinions, where the audience of mostly lawyers might not be aware in a particular
case that the choice of an historian signals an ideological preference.
194. WILLIAM KELLEHER STOREY, WRITING HISTORY: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 18 (2d
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the footnotes, but it is also important to approach an analysis using
primary sources differently from an analysis using secondary ones.195 As
discussed above, a judge citing a letter of George Washington's or an
essay from The Federalist, for example, is most likely to be constructing
her own intellectual history of the framing rather than simply using a
secondary account. More transparency is required in that situation so
that the reader can understand the judge's interpretive choices. If, on the
other hand, the judge is citing a secondary work, such as Macaulay's The
History of England,196 it would suffice simply to acknowledge the
secondary work and justify any deviations from the conclusions in the
work. The judge could also note whether the work has been accepted as
authoritative in another professional or academic discipline such as
history. 197 If the judge has knowledge about the reputation of the author,
such as whether that author's work is usually associated with liberal or
conservative causes, the judge could include that as well.
An intriguing prospect involves engaging historians of various
ideological stripes to develop a set of standards to use that is peculiar to
judicial opinion writing. The standards could be published in a leading
law journal and republished on a web page. These standards would not
bind the U.S. Supreme Court in Establishment Clause cases, but one
would expect the collective judgment of nonpartisan experts to carry
some weight.' 98 If the historical professional itself has no interest in
drafting such guidelines, there are plenty of historians on law faculties
who could undertake such a project. Judges may be wary of making a
ed. 2004). Martin Flaherty goes further in prescribing methodological requirements for
legal academics, stressing the "necessity of a thorough reading, or at least citation, of
both primary and secondary source material generally recognized by historians as central
to a given question," so that lawyers can view events and ideas in their larger historical
context. Flaherty, supra note 25, at 553, 553-54. "Too often, legal scholars make a fetish
of one or two famous primary sources, and consider the historical ease made." Flaherty,
supra note 25, at 554.
195. Flaherty, supra note 25, at 553.
196. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1849) (cited in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 at 9, n. 5. (1947)). The caveat found in Storey's student guide should be repeated
here, lest the historian reader fret over the omission; Macaulay's work would be a
primary source if the subject of study were nineteenth century England. STOREY, supra
note 194, at 19.
197. See, e.g., STOREY, supra note 194, at 19 (characterizing Macaulay's work as
"classic"). If the judge is unaware of any peer review or other commentary, the judge
could determine whether the work is listed in the AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION'S
GUIDE TO LITERATURE, a collective work in three separate volumes spanning the
twentieth century. These volumes involve some selection and bias, but they are deemed
authoritative and are touted as a good starting place for students and nonhistorians. See
STOREY, supra note 194, at 6-7 (apparently discussing the most recent guide).
198. It would be important to avoid the appearance that the standards themselves
represent some sort of rebuke. Compare, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987).
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request for help, perceiving the gesture as a concession of institutional
weakness or worse, professional incompetence. But just as historians
may have trouble working with legal documents to resolve problems in
history, 199 even some of the best legal minds could use help writing
history to decide cases.
III. A Procedural Solution
Given the intensity of the debate over history, it is reasonable to
assume that the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine will remain
frozen at the point of the exchange between Justices Stevens and
Scalia.200  As discussed earlier, this Article proposes a procedural
solution that offers some help: separation of the history from the holding
in the Court's opinion.
A review of the problem may shed light on the wisdom of a
procedural solution. The Establishment Clause originalists want history
to determine the outcome while the living Constitutionalists believe that
the history deserves a far less significant role, and, fueled by the work of
historians, each camp openly challenges the other's treatment of
history.20 1 Scholars, students, and others are confused and/or skeptical
about the role history actually plays in the Court's Establishment Clause
202decisions. Moreover, they question the way in which both the
originalists and the living Constitutionalists use history to reach
203decisions. A procedural solution in which the Court separates its
treatment of history from its analysis of law and then explains the
significance of the history to the decision in the case offers the benefits
of transparency, clarity and legitimacy.
A. The Virtues of Transparency
As a society we value transparency, so there may seem to be little
need to point out its virtues. In the context of opinion writing, Justice
Breyer has complained that history-based decisions contain inherently
subjective elements that preclude transparency.20 4 In his words, "[a]
decision that directly addresses consequences, purposes, and values is no
more subjective, at worst, and has the added value of exposing
199. See Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2, 59 WM & MARY
QUARTERLY 135 (2002); see also Thomas J. Davis, Conspiracy and Credibility: Look
Who's Taking, about What-Law Talk and Loose Talk, 59 WM & MARY QUARTERLY 167
(2002).
200. See supra Part I.B.4.
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. See supra note 3.
203. Id.
204. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 127 (2005).
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underlying judicial motivations, specifying the points of doubt for all to
read. '20 5  Nonetheless, some might reasonably fear that such
transparency threatens the judiciary's public mantle of objectivity.
Consider that the opinion writers are the Members of the Supreme Court
and the setting is church/state relations, and the threat may appear more
serious. It is precisely in this context, however, that transparency has
some distinct advantages.
20 6
1. Transparency of Motive
One of the chief complaints about law office history is that it
obscures the actual engine of the decision.20 7 In Reynolds, the Court
found it "appropriate" to survey the history surrounding the Religion
Clauses, and then it discovered history that led to a certain interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause that resolved the case against the Mormon
plaintiffs.20 8 Now imagine that the Court had been required to discuss
the history, taking into account contrary arguments and evidence
provided by counsel and/or any dissent, and then separately justify the
use of the history to decide that case. If something such as an agenda to
oppress Mormons and not the pursuit of truth were driving the decision,
it would have been much harder to conceal. A judge stepping from Point
A (assertion of historical fact) to Point B (legal conclusion) must
rationalize the move from A to B beyond simple conclusions that the
Establishment Clause "commands" or "forever forbade" this or that.
And a weak explanation is more likely to indicate some basis other than
history driving the decision. True, good rhetoreticians can conceal the
ugliest of agendas, just as sophisticated burglars can flout ordinary
security systems. Still, common experience suggests a widely shared
belief that the use of ordinary security measures is preferable to none at
all. In the same way, a procedural framework that makes it more
difficult to hide an inappropriate basis for decision does some good.209
205. Id. ("This is particularly important because transparency of rationale permits
informed public criticism of opinions; and that criticism, in a democracy, plays an
important role in checking abuse of power."); see also David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 737 (1987).
206. This is not to say, however, that the procedural approach advocated in this article
cannot be applied to the Court's use of history more generally. Likewise, the procedural
approach of separating the basis for the decision from the decision itself may appeal to
those who find the misuse of precedent or policy just as problematic as the asserted
misuse of history.
207. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 19.
208. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878).
209. It is also possible that once an inappropriate basis for decision becomes apparent
to the opinion writer, she will reconsider that decision-an anecdotal phenomenon
sometimes described as the opinion that just "won't write." Cf, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk,
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Transparency of motive, in turn, increases legitimacy. Suppose, for
example, that in its Everson decision the Court had explained its
assumptions and choices, and even acknowledged some of the
weaknesses in its historical case. At best, a modem reader of Everson
might be less inclined to assume that the Court was either patently wrong
or hostile to the growth of parochial schools. 2  At worst, a display of
candor in Everson might have softened the blows from the criticisms that
eventually came, and would have permitted the Court to revisit some of
its historical assertions without losing face. Advocates would have
perceived the concerns driving the Court so that future cases could be
briefed and argued on grounds that might deliver a win. Furthermore,
Court skeptics soured by the perceived injustice of the decision could
focus their criticism on the Court's approach to the issues presented in
the case rather than on the polemics of history. By contrast, unwavering
assertion of conviction and rectitude tends to strain rather than foster
credibility, and certainly makes it harder to publicly rethink one's
position.
2. Transparency of Methodology
The procedural solution of bifurcation also provides readers with a
comparison of apples and apples. Suppose again that the justices as
authors of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
Establishment Clause cases were required to treat the history section
separately from the decision in the case. The justices would be required
to identify whether they were constructing an historical account from
original sources, repeating a historical narrative created by someone else
or blending the two methods. When working from original sources,
justices would be required to explain the choice of source, and might
even be inclined to speak to authenticity, as well as assumptions made in
interpretation, analysis and synthesis of materials. 2 11 On the other hand,
justices using secondary sources would need to justify the choice of
source or, at the very least, the selection of a particular narrative or
account from a given source.
Because the strengths and weaknesses in the differing historical
accounts would be plain, the justices would have an incentive to take the
history seriously. So, for example, living Constitutionalist justices would
Michael Heise, Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1411 (1998).
210. Philip Hamburger's SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, for example, makes
much of Justice Black's alleged connections to the Klu Klux Klan. See HAMBURGER,
supra note 3, at 422-34.
211. See SHAFER, supra note 188.
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score fewer points by simply poking holes or threatening to expose
embarrassing weaknesses in the originalists' historical case. Similarly,
originalist justices would have to explain the holes and the weaknesses
rather than charge that, in the places where the history fails, their
ideological opponents offer no apparent substantive alternative to
originalism. In short, the opinions in Supreme Court decisions would
actually speak to each other and, more importantly, would speak to
readers (such as students) who may not be precommitted to a particular
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
B. The Limits of a Procedural Solution
Though this article has proceeded as if questionable use of history
were the biggest problem with the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause doctrine, those familiar with the area recognize that it provides a
sizeable target for any critic. 2 The Court's use of history only amplifies
the confusion in the doctrine, so an improvement in the cogency of the
treatment of history likely means an improvement overall, which is no
small accomplishment. Still, the procedural approach would provide
consistency to the Court's Establishment Clause cases in format only.
Future opinions would contain the same basic elements, but a procedural
safeguard could not guarantee that the Court would (or would not) make
history the basis for decision in every Establishment Clause case.
Because this approach fails to address the substantive problem of
inconsistently applied Establishment Clause doctrine, it is by nature only
a partial solution. Based on the state of that doctrine, however, there is
ample reason to welcome a promising procedural change, even if
somewhat limited in its scope.
C. An Example of Reform
To evaluate the efficacy of the procedural approach, it may be
helpful to sample an opinion written within that framework, so I have
chosen to rewrite the Court's decision in Everson. This rewritten version
appears in Appendix A. There were many likely candidates, but Everson
seemed a good choice given its role as the fountainhead of modem
Establishment Clause history. The rewrite is partial; what is found there
pertains only to the discussion in this article.
To be sure, the re-writing of Everson presented some difficulties of
the kind already described in this article. Making Justice Black's and the
majority's choices transparent required me to assume what those choices
212. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006).
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may have been. I decided to focus particular attention on the work of
two historians, Cobb and Sweet,2 13 because their works are cited in the
original Everson opinion and, more importantly, by Justice Rutledge to
support the proposition that the Virginia experience was a paradigm for
the First Amendment.2 14 These historians focused on the role of religious
dissenters as the heroes in this country's history of religious liberty,
defined as nonestablishment, and they apparently assumed that the First
Amendment embodied that same liberty.215  Sweet concludes that
Massachussetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire, with establishments
that existed well beyond the adoption and ratification of the First
Amendment, simply lagged behind Virginia and the Federal
216Constitution. My cursory review of these works and the Everson
account confirms the insight of the Holmes quotation that opened this
article-Cobb and Sweet were interested in the very specific question of
who brought about religious liberty.217 The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, was interested in the meaning of the First Amendment.2 18 They
were working in the same past but with arguably different histories. My
sense is, albeit in hindsight, that some transparency about method might
have tipped off readers to this incongruity.
The re-written opinion's reflections upon the quality of its history
are made with the benefit of sixty years of commentary in the rear view
mirror; nonetheless, the re-write is not a "What Everson Should Have
Said"219 type of opinion. The rewritten opinion maintains the substance
of the original and merely presents that substance in a new format. It is
in many places only slightly modified from the original, but it does
213. See COBB, supra note 60; SWEET, supra note 60; WILLIAM WARREN SWEET,
RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1942); see also APPENDIX A, infra. Historian Paul
Murphy criticized Justice Black's citation of Cobb's work and other sources in the
Justice's opinion in Engel v. Vitale. See Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current
Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 65 (1963).
Murphy found that Cobb's and the other works represented a "once important, although
now outdated view." Id., cited in Reid, supra note 3, at 203.
214. See Everson v. Bd.ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
215. It is interesting that Sweet conflates religious freedom with the separation of
church and state, see SWEET, COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 213, at 339, a move which
Hamburger generally criticizes as historical fallacy, see HAMBURGER, supra note 3, at
353-54 (noting Sweet's use of the term in another work).
216. See SWEET, STORY OF RELIGION, supra note 60, at 274-75; SWEET, COLONIAL
AMERICA, supra note 213, at 339. Cobb seems more nuanced in his view, though he
agrees. See COBB, supra note 60, at 509-17. Justice Black's opinion adopts that position.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13-14; Reiss, supra note 3, at 115.
217. See infra note 220.
218. See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
219. Here, I loosely refer to Jack Balkin's popular series, WHAT BROwN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATON SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) and more recently, WHAT ROE
V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
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contain some important improvements. The Court's choices and
interpretations are more transparent. The holes in the Court's history are
made plain, and though they may give critics cause to be concerned, the
critics need not worry that the Court was merely oblivious to potential
problems with its history. The tentative nature of the historical claims
preserves the integrity of history for those who disagree with the Court's
version. The Court's policy choices are also clear; those who accept the
history but dislike the decision cannot accuse the Court of simply
misapplying the history. Ultimately, the reader can judge whether the re-
written opinion accomplishes any of the objectives stated in this article,
but the candor and tone of the opinion leaves room for fruitful
discussions about history, doctrine, or both.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that the Supreme Court's use of history
in Establishment Clause cases reveals an ideological divide that has
undermined the Court's doctrine. I have proposed a solution in which
Establishment Clause majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
separate the historical materials from the decision in Everson. This
small, procedural change would take an unusual step toward
transparency, clarity, and legitimacy.
The procedural solution promises improvements in the way the
Court evaluates history, highlighting some debates that show no signs of
220becoming extinct. Under this approach, Court disagreement on the
role of Establishment Clause history may be less likely to color the
history itself, and future decisions might reflect intellectual collaboration
among the Justices rather than stubborn ideological divisions. Perhaps
most important, the procedural solution invites the reader to clearly
perceive what the Court has done with history, under fluorescent lights
and without the usual rhetoric of Establishment Clause opinions.22' In
220. The argument that the Establishment Clause was originally intended as a
jurisdictional provision that prevented Congress from disturbing state establishments has
received renewed scholarly and Court attention in the past several years. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33-35 (1998);
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as
a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1998); see also Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (making the
historical argument that 14th Amendment incorporation of the Establishment Clause was
improper); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46, 49-53 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (raising the argument); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 232-304 (Brennan, J., concurring) (addressing the argument);
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (making the argument).
221. As Steven Smith has said in the context of the jurisdictional claim mentioned
above, without the blessing of history, arguments about which Establishment Clause we
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the end, we could achieve a more thoughtful and defensible
jurisprudence of history in the area of the Establishment Clause.
want will simply have to "bear their own weight." See Podcast, supra note 3 (oral
remarks of Steven Smith); see also Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment
Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1843, 1893 (2006).
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APPENDIX A
The re-written Everson majority opinion*
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
The New Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting an
establishment of religion." The First Amendment, as made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth 222 commands that a state "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. .. ." These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds
of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices
which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for
themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless their goal has not been
entirely reached; but so far has the Nation moved toward it that the
expression "law respecting an establishment of religion," probably does
not so vividly remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and
political problems that caused that expression to be written into our Bill
of Rights. Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an
"establishment of religion" requires an understanding of the meaning of
that language, particularly with respect to the imposition of taxes. Once
again, 223 therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review the
background and environment of the period in which that constitutional
language was fashioned and adopted.
History
Introduction and Statement of Method
Several historians have attempted to recreate the intellectual
landscape of the attitudes of the Founders of this Nation, and their work
informs this Court's discussion of the history leading up to the Framing
* This rewrite loosely tracks the language of the original Everson opinion,
including footnotes, beginning at page eight. Large portions of the opinion have been
deleted, but additions and deletions have not been noted. For an accurate comparison,
see Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-18. The Editors would like the reader to know that the re-
write, like the Everson opinion itself, lacks attribution footnotes in places where such
footnotes most certainly would be required by today's standards. It should also be noted
that the Editors have updated many of the citations to reflect current Blue Book
conventions, and in one case an erroneous pinpoint citation has been changed.
222. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
223. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878); cf Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 89, 106 (1900).
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of the First Amendment. The Court is particularly impressed by the
writings of distinguished historians such as Sanford Cobb and William
Warren Sweet, whose work tends to focus on the plight of religious
dissenters and their role in bringing about religious liberty-a theme that
no doubt animated the Framers of the First Amendment. The Court has
not conducted an independent review of all of the primary source
documents, but uses primary sources such as James Madison's
"Detached Memorandum"224 to amplify important points.
Finally, the reader will note that the historical section, due in
particular to the rather extensive citation and explanation of historical
sources and conclusions, is lengthier than the average opinion. The
Court deems necessary the added length given the importance of this
decision as the first to apply the "establishment of religion" clause to the
States. It should be kept in mind that the Court's expertise rests, of
course, in the domain of law and not history.
Narrative
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here
from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to
attend and support with taxes and tithes government-favored churches.
The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the
colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and
persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to
maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. These
practices and persecutions of the old world were transplanted to and
began to thrive in the soil of the new America.
Such practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-
loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. 225 The imposition of taxes
to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain churches and church
property aroused indignation in Virginia.2 26 It was these feelings which
224. James Madison, Detached Memorandum, published in 3 WILLIAM AND MARY Q.
534, 551, 555 (1946).
225. Madison wrote to a friend in 1774: "That diabolical, hell-conceived principle of
persecution rages among some.... This vexes me the worst of anything whatever.
There are at this time in the adjacent country not less than five or six well-meaning men
in close jail for publishing their religious sentiments, which in the main are very
orthodox. I have neither patience to hear, talk, or think of anything relative to this matter;
for I have squabbled and scolded, abused and ridiculed, so long about it to little purpose,
that I am without common patience. So I must beg you to pity me, and pray for liberty of
conscience to all." I WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (1900) 18, 21, quoted in SANFORD H.
COBB, RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 490 (1902).
226. Virginia's resistance to taxation for church support was crystallized in the
famous "Parsons' Cause" that Patrick Henry argued against in 1763, in which state-
supported clergy opposed a statute that had the effect of reducing their salaries. For a
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found expression in the First Amendment. No one locality and no one
group throughout the Colonies can be given entire credit for having
aroused the sentiment that culminated in adoption of the Bill of Rights'
provisions embracing religious liberty, but Virginia, where the
established church had achieved a dominant influence in political affairs
and where many excesses attracted wide public attention, provided a
great stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people there,
as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty
could be achieved best under a government that was stripped of all power
to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to
interfere with the beliefs of any religious group."'
In its analysis of the history, the Court began with the conclusion
above, stated succinctly in Reynolds v. United States, that "[t]he
controversy upon this general subject ... seemed at last to culminate in
Virginia., 228 Several facts confirm the Court's statements regarding the
significance of Virginia. As detailed by Justice Rutledge in his dissent,
James Madison, the author and sponsor of the first draft of the First
Amendment, publicly opposed the Virginia assessment described below
in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance. The Memorial, appended in
full to Justice Rutledge's opinion, sets out a plausible interpretation of
religious liberty which coheres with issues presented in modern times.
Virginia aggressively resisted the established church, a path that
eventually was followed by each of the remaining establishments.
Virginia therefore embodies a prophetic vision of religious freedom that
serves as a model for the early, as well as contemporary, meanings of
that idea.229 Because Thomas Jefferson drafted the "Virginia Bill for
brief account see COBB, supra note 60, 108-11.
227. It is acknowledged that a close inspection of another historical experience based,
perhaps, on another working hypothesis, might shade our interpretation of the First
Amendment. A survey of the established Congregationalist Church in Massachusetts, for
example, may show less popular resistance to the state establishment of religion during
the period in question than the established Church of England in Virginia.
228. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
229. This appears to be a theme in Cobb's treatment of Virginia and in his
conclusions about religious liberty in the colonies. See generally COBB, supra note 60.
Sweet, after discussing the disestablishment movement in Virginia leading up to the
passage of Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religion Freedom," concludes: "Religious
freedom had triumphed in Virginia and was soon to spread throughout the nation, and a
few years later in the form of the first amendment to the Federal Constitution was to
become a part of the fundamental law of the land." SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION,
supra note 59, at 192; cf SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 339 (1942) ("With the
coming of the Revolution, the long struggle for religious freedom and the separation of
Church and State in America had been virtually won.... The embodiment of these great
principles in the new state constitutions and finally in the Federal constitution itself was
simply writing colonial experience into the fundamental law of the land.").
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Religious Liberty,, 230 the Court gives Jefferson's views on the meaning
and scope of the First Amendment considerable weight. Finally, the
Court has not been provided with briefs asserting a contrary historical
interpretation; therefore, the Court reads the secondary sources to assert
that the Virginia experience is a particularly relevant part of this
country's history of religious liberty, including the language
"establishment of religion" found in the First Amendment.231 The Court
has not compared and does not discuss the original and successive drafts
of the First Amendment, having chosen instead to focus only on the final
language that was adopted. 32 It is assumed that the men who drafted
that charter spoke for the people who called for it, and that the call for
religious liberty was heard and understood.233
Indeed, the facts of the Virginia Assessment Controversy support
the Court's interpretation of the scope intended for the language
prohibiting an establishment of religion by the drafters of the First
Amendment. In Virginia, the movement toward disestablishment
reached its dramatic climax in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative
body was about to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the
established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the fight
against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance
against the law. 234 In it, he eloquently argued that a true religion did not
need the support of the law; that no person, either believer or
nonbeliever, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any
kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men
always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable
result of government-established religions. Madison's Remonstrance
235received strong support throughout Virginia, and the Assembly
postponed consideration of the proposed tax measure until its next
230. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163; cf SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION, supra note 60,
at 191-92.
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
232. Likewise, the Court does not survey evidence of the intent of the States that
ratified the First Amendment.
233. To the extent that the history explicated in Reynolds is not binding on this Court,
however, the Court notes that it finds the Virginia experience to be useful given its
resonance with the issues facing contemporary society. When history appears to repeat
itself-thus offering up a lesson on the proper relationship between church and state-
that history and the concomitant lesson must be heeded, even if an exhaustive review of
historical materials might give rise to a quarrel over the history or the lesson.
234. II WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183.
235. In a recently discovered collection of Madison's papers, Madison recollected
that his Remonstrance "met with the approbation of the Baptists, the Presbyterians, the
Quakers, and the few Roman Catholics, universally; of the Methodists in part; and even
of not a few of the Sect formerly established by law." Madison, Monopolies,
Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments, in Fleet, Madison's "Detached
Memorandum, " 3 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 534, 551, 555 (1946).
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session. When the proposal came up for consideration at that session, it
not only died in committee, but the Assembly enacted the famous
"Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" originally written by Thomas
Jefferson.236 The preamble to that Bill stated among other things that
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to
influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness,
and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion,
who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it
by coercions on either... ; that to compel a man to fumish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is
depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to
the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern .... 237
And the statute itself enacted
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall
otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief....238
This Court has previously recognized, as discussed above, that the
provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which
Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective
and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental
intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.239 Prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not
apply as a restraint against the states.240 Most of them did soon provide
similar constitutional protections for religious liberty.241 But some states
persisted for about half a century in imposing restraints upon the free
236. For general accounts of background and evolution of the Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty see JAMES, THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY tN VIRGINIA (1900);
THOM, THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN VIRGINIA: THE BAPTISTS (1900); COBB,
supra, note 5, 74-115; Madison, Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical
Endowments supra, note 235, at 554, 556.
237. 12 HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823); COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (1944).
238. 12 HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 86.
239. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 679 (1871).
240. See generally Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845); Barron v. Baltimore,
23 U.S. 243 (1833).
241. For a collection of state constitutional provisions on freedom of religion see
GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 148-49 (1937). See also 2
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 960-85 (1927).
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Given the rich history of religious liberty, it seems appropriate to
interpret the scope of the First Amendment according to the history
surrounding its drafting and adoption. The Court is satisfied that the
history provides a workable account of relevant events and attitudes
leading up to the adoption of the First Amendment, even though some
questions remain unanswered and still others remain unexplored. That
history, discussed above, and our precedents interpreting the First
Amendment, discussed below, guide our decision in this case.
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,243 in the
light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have
been several times elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the
application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth.244
The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been
accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's
religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was
interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action
abridging religious freedom. 245 There is every reason to give the same
application and broad interpretation to the "establishment of religion"
clause. Counseling against such an interpretation, however, is the fact,
acknowledged earlier, that state establishments persisted beyond the
adoption of the First Amendment. It is clear as a historical matter,
therefore, that the Federal Constitution did not touch existing state
establishments, and apparently was not designed to do so. It may seem
inconsistent with history, therefore, to apply the federal prohibition
against the states. In gleaning from this Nation's history, however, the
Court focuses on the idea of individual freedom from state
242. Test provisions forbade officeholders to "deny... the truth of the Protestant
religion." E.g. N.C. CONST.(1776) § XXXII; II Poore, Constitutions 1390, 1413 (1878).
Maryland permitted taxation for support of the Christian religion and limited civil office
to Christians until 1818, id., I, 819, 820, 832.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
244. See generally Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Terrett v. Taylor, 13
U.S. 43 (1815); cf Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
245. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Follett v. McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S.
418 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); cf
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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establishments that pervaded the writings of Madison and Jefferson.
This very individual freedom is consistent with our precedents
interpreting the "freedom of speech" and "free exercise of religion"
language of the First Amendment in the light of the Fourteenth
Amendment.246 Such an interpretation also seems desirable as a matter
of policy, particularly given the recent and historical controversies over
public aid to sectarian education.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to, or to remain away from, church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, or for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt, to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State.,
247
Now as ever, the history developed earlier, of which Jefferson's words
are an important part, appeals to our sense of prudence and justice.
We must consider the New Jersey statute in accordance with the
foregoing limitations imposed by the First Amendment. Measured by
these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New
Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial
school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the bus
fares of pupils attending public and other schools. It appears that these
parochial schools meet New Jersey's secular educational requirements.
The State contributes no money to these schools. It does not support
them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
Though the history discussed earlier impresses upon us the
importance of separation of church and state, the dangers Jefferson and
Madison envisioned are not present in the instant case. The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. For historical,
practical, and policy reasons, that wall must be kept high and
246. See cases cited supra note 245.
247. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
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impregnable. We could not and will not approve the slightest breach.
New Jersey has not breached it here.

